Crunch time for the middle powers
To avoid the pincers of snapping giants, a set of middle-weight countries must seize this chance to reestablish rules
Hassan Damluji, February 2025
This is the first of a three-part series on the role of middle powers to defend the principles of international order in a post-hegemonic age.
Source: Picture by Simon Dawson / No 10 Downing Street.
The world contains, in the US and China, two superpowers. Then there is Russia, a pseudo-superpower, with none of the others’ economic might, but enough ballistics and bravado to play the part. Let’s call these three the giants.
Historically, the US has seen itself as the only giant that guards a much vaunted ‘Order’, which the other two seek to subvert. But we now live in a terrifying world in which all three giants are rogue actors. It’s time for the middle powers to step up and assert their collective authority, to keep the giants in check and avoid being squashed.
The 'Order’ was never perfect. As an Iraqi, I know that as well as anyone. It was pretty shambolic if we’re honest. However, it contained some important principles that were honored sufficiently regularly to be meaningful, and whose breaches were sufficiently embarrassing to occasionally stay the hand of bad actors.
These principles include, most prominently, that countries should respect each other’s sovereignty and should not invade each other except in self-defense - an idea powerful enough to ensure that the Iraq war had to somehow be justified as self-defense (ludicrous as that now sounds). When in conflict, countries should not commit war crimes or crimes against humanity. In peacetime, countries should trade with each other fairly, although the definition of fair trade and how ‘free’ that trade should be has always been debated. When issues arise, whether disputes over trade, or global problems like climate change, countries should work multilaterally (whether through the UN or other forums) to solve their problems, and abide by international agreements they have signed. Finally, rich countries should support poorer countries in their development or during crises.
For three generations of humankind, these have been the core principles of the international system. All of them, from time to time, have been abused, broken and scorned. But despite the many victims of an unjust world, these principles did offer a large degree of protection to most. For every invasion of Iraq, how many land grabs were prevented by the international norm of sovereignty? For all the inequities built into late capitalism, how many millions of lives were improved by economic development made possible by trade? Despite all the greenwashing and jargon, how much worse would climate change be if countries had not stood up and made public net-zero commitments? And for all the aid money wasted, how much worse off would the world’s poorest people be without the hundreds of billions of dollars in official development assistance channeled to the Global South?
The United States has always played an ambiguous role in relation to an order that has often been called “US-led”. On the one hand, it has very often breached the principles of the order that bears its name. Nevertheless, it has generally made efforts to appear to its own citizens and the world, as a country that mostly abides by them. More significantly, its huge military has created a disincentive for others to break the rules.
All that is over.
Respect sovereignty? We would rather seize Greenland, Panama and Gaza.
War crimes? We won’t just allow them, we’ll openly call for them.
Trading fairly? We prefer to impose punitive tariffs in an attempt to force concessions.
Solve problems multilaterally? We’d rather walk out of international organizations.
Help poor countries? Nah, we’ll feed USAID to the “wood chipper”.
And what about dissuading others from breaking the rules? Not likely.
America’s posture has slowly been evolving in this direction for some time, as I wrote a year ago. But we have now woken up to a world where the transformation is complete.
In fact, the United States has moved so far from its status as defender of international order, that China has a greater claim to that title. China and America are both threatening expansionist invasions to increase their territory, but China has not withdrawn from the WHO, nor the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. It has not ended its foreign aid, nor started any recent trade wars. The US has done all of these things in a bewildering month that has shattered its global standing for at least a generation. Warren Buffet always used to say that a reputation takes a lifetime to build and five minutes to destroy. Trump’s America has just proven that theory.
China will not be the savior of multilateralism, however. For a number of years it has been patiently building (or rebuilding) an order centered on itself, where data, economic power and political homage all flow in one direction. Despite their differences, the US, Russia and China now have more in common than distinguishes them. These three giants are looking at the countries in their peripheries as targets, and they are trying to reshape their regions into closed systems in which the only principle of international relations is that ‘might is right’. Gideon Rachman, writing in the Financial Times, has called this a “new age of empire”.
What comes next? There are three options that other countries can choose from.
The first option is to get in line behind one or other of the giants. To do that will be to welcome in a century of disempowerment, humiliation and economic disadvantage. This may feel like the status quo for many countries. But even today’s hub-and-spoke inequalities will pale in comparison to a new age of imperialism led by wrecker giants. Denmark and Panama are discovering that ‘getting in line’ now means giving up territory containing their most valuable natural resources. Canada and Mexico are discovering that it means either kowtowing, or economic annihilation.
The second option is for countries to create their own regional poles in a multipolar world. The European Union could attempt to create a European ‘giant’ that has its own bullying rights. The African Union could work to ensure that the African continent bands together to ward off threats. This approach is tempting, and regional cooperation remains a good idea. But as a ‘grand strategy’, it is wanting. Few regions have any hope of becoming a pole that could take on the giants. Europe has the best chance, but its circumscribed economic and military might, and its fissiparous politics, mean that it would struggle to stand up to aggression on its own. Africa, Latin America, the Indian subcontinent and South-East Asia would have even less chance. Despite the appealing concept of regional alignment, often the most testy of diplomatic relationships are between neighbouring countries. It is therefore often the case that partnerships with countries outside the region can strengthen intra-regional diplomacy. Think, for example, of the way in which Japan and South Korea’s mutual hostility has been softened by their mutual alliance with America. Regional alliances then, are good but insufficient in a world of rampaging giants.
The final option, and the most advisable one, is a global alliance of the middle powers, to defend the principles of international order in a post-hegemonic age. This would arguably be the first attempt at true multilateralism, conceived as a partnership of equals. By the “middle powers”, I am referring to the large group of countries which each have significant assets to bring to the table, but insufficient might to act alone. These are the countries with the most to lose from the death of the international community, and the most ability to defend it. They include America’s hitherto closest allies: the UK, members of the EU, Canada and Australia. But they also include a host of other countries across Asia, Africa and Latin America, such as India, Japan, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Arab Gulf countries, South Africa, Brazil and Chile. Others could be added to the list. The point is precisely not to be exclusive, but rather to build as wide an alliance as possible to stand up to the giants and, where possible, incentivize them to join a system of rules. At the core of such an alliance must be the countries with the economic or military heft to make a difference, but no one need be left out. The aim, in fact, should be to eventually persuade even the giants to join, leading to a rejuvenation of multilateralism and a return to times of stability and peace.
During the Cold War, there was a non-aligned movement of countries that wanted to avoid picking sides between the US and USSR. A middle power alliance in the 21st century might be the equivalent of a non-aligned movement for a world of rogue giants. But it will need to go further than simply “not aligning”. In the next part of this series I will therefore set out how a global alliance to defend the principles of international order would work in practice.
This is a three-part short essay series on the end of the US-led world order. In the first part, we made the case for why a set of middle-weight countries must seize this chance to reestablish rules and push back against the unchecked power of the giants.
Stay tuned and subscribed for the next in the series focused on how a global alliance of middle powers would work in practice…